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TRUSTS-VALIDITY OF SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS-Defendant, a judgment
debtor, was one of three beneficiaries of a trust agreement which granted
him an income of 1,500 dollars annually until his daughter reached the age
of twenty-five,1 at which time he was to receive one-third of the corpus.
The trust agreement contained a clause prohibiting voluntary or involuntary alienation of the beneficiary's interest in the income or principal of
the 91,000 dollar trust estate. Plaintiff-creditor's attempt to apply the
defendant's right to receive annual income toward the satisfaction of a
41,000 dollar judgment was denied by the trial court and the Ohio court
of appeals on the basis of these restrictive provisions. On appeal, held,
reversed, three judges dissenting. In the absence <>f specific legislative
authorization, a settlor may not exempt from the claims of creditors the
continuing and enforceable right of a beneficiary to reach trust income.2
Sherrow v. Brookover, 174 Ohio St. 310, 189 N.E.2d 90 (1963).
The division of authority in American courts on the issue of the validity
of a trust provision stating that the interest8 of the cestui shall not be subject to the claims of creditors,4 ordinarily termed a spendthrift clause, is
a modem counterpart of the feudalistic clash of ideas on freedom of alienation. 5 Efforts to protect the interest of a cestui from involuntary alienation
have been disallowed in England6 on the ground that alienability is an

1964]

RECENT DECISIONS

543

inherent incident of an equitable life interest and such a restrictive clause,
being repugnant to the grant, is therefore void. American courts, however,
relying primarily on the elaborate dictum of an 1875 Supreme Court decision7 to the effect that a donor may dispose of his property as he desires,
began to uphold spendthrift trusts in the late nineteenth century. 8 Despite
continuing criticism by eminent authority,9 restraints upon the involuntary
alienation of a beneficiary's equitable interests are presently upheld in a
majority of the states having no relevant statutes, and also in a majority of
the states having some legislation, in situations in which the legislation is inapplicable.10
The legal dialectic concerning the validity of the extreme form of
restraint,11 whereby all creditors are prevented from reaching any part of
the right to receive trust income, illustrates the irreconcilability of the
opposing positions. In answer to the proposition that a donor may give his
property as he wishes,12 opponents of the spendthrift trust point out that
the privilege of disposal of property is subject to numerous limitations,13
such as the inability of a donor to impose a valid restraint on a legal
interest.14 The argument that creditors may not enlarge the gift of a donor
who has seen fit to leave the trust property beyond their reach15 is met
with the reply that, since a settlor may not create a spendthrift trust for
his own benefit,16 to uphold spendthrift provisions would be to enable a
donor to give something he does not possess.17 The English courts' reasoning that spendthrift provisions are repugnant to an equitable life estate
has been countered by the assertion that the spendthrift device does not
make either income or principal inalienable, since the entire legal title, with
power of alienation, passes to the trustee, and the legal title to the income
accrues to the beneficiary at the moment he receives it. 18 On the other hand,
it has been argued with equal validity that the donor may not part with an
absolute estate while passing only a qualified one to his beneficiary.19
7

Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 724-30 (1875).

8

E.g., Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882). For a comprehensive

review of the earlier cases, see GRAY, R.llsntAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPER.TY (2d ed.
1895).
9 Gray, preface to GRAY, op. cit. supra note 8, at i-xii; GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note
5, §§ 551-55; 2 ScOTT, TRUSTS § 152 (2d ed. 1956).
10 The cases are compiled in Annot., 119 A.L.R. 19 (1939), supplemented by Annot.,
34 A.L.R.2d 1335 (1954). For an extensive discussion of the status of spendthrift provisions
in the various states, see GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 51-79.
11 See generally Bucklin v. Warton, 243 Iowa 312, 51 N.W.2d 412 (1952).
12 Morgan's Estate, 223 Pa. 228, 72 Atl. 498 (1909), is a typical example of the use
of the maxim cujus est dare, ejus est disponere to uphold a spendthrift provision.
13 GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note 5, § 553.
14 E.g., Graham v. Johnson, 243 Iowa 112, 49 N.W.2d 540 (1951); Swan v. Gunderson,
51 S.D. 588, 215 N.W. 884 (1927). See generally IA BOGER.T, op. cit. supra note 4, § 220.
15 Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 174 (1882).
16 McColgan v. Walter Magee, Inc., 172 Cal. 182, 155 Pac. 995 (1916). See generally
2 Scorr, op. cit. supra note 9, § 221.
17 Brahmey v. Rollins, 87 N.H. 290, 179 Atl. 186 (1935), 45 YALE L.J. 164 (1935).
18 Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 173 (1882).
19 In re Smyth, 49 R.I. 27, 29, 139 Atl. 657, 659 (1927).
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It would seem that these inconclusive arguments for and against the
validity of spendthrift provisions do not reach the crucial question-whether
such restraints are against public policy.20 If a donor may impose restrictions upon the interest of his cestui, it is not because of any logical deduction from the premise that a donor has freedom of disposition, but because
there is no public policy opposed to it. 21 While there is no clear answer, the
stronger policy considerations appear to militate against the validity of
the spendthrift trust considered in the abstract. The desirability of protecting incompetent persons who are likely to dissipate their inheritance,
including that portion necessary for their support, is conceded.22 However,
the spendthrift trust is not limited to those who need protection, and may
be created as well for debtors who are not spendthrifts and who, by virtue
of their trust income, are financially able to meet their obligations.23 It
has been argued that creditors are not prejudiced by spendthrift provisions
because such restraints are a matter of public record.24 However, it is unreasonable to expect a creditor to investigate the source of an apparently
able individual's income,25 and the public record argument fails completely
in the case of a tort claimant, or where the restrictions appear in an unrecorded inter vivas trust. Speculations concerning the effect of the spendthrift trust doctrine upon the character of the individual cestui,26 and
upon the ethical27 and economic28 well-being of society in general have
frequently been advanced by advocates of both views, but they are of
little assistance, since there is no evidence of actual results. Perhaps the
most convincing argument against the validity of restraints upon involuntary alienation is also one of the oldest, i.e., the thought that it is unjust
to permit a competent adult to receive the benefits of wealth without being
subject to its responsibilities.29
The majority opinion in the principal case, after stating the primary
arguments against validity, relied in part upon an Ohio statute80 permitting a creditor to apply toward his claim the right of debtor-beneficiary
to receive trust income. The court reasoned that to permit a donor to
exempt from execution property rights which are subject to the statute
would allow him to create exemptions for himself or a beneficiary in addition to those provided by statute.31 However, this reasoning should not
20 See 2 Scon, op. cit. supra note 9, § 152.
21 Sheridan v. Krause, 161 Va. 873, 893, 172 S.E. 508, 514 (1934).
22 See Costigan, Those Protective Trusts Which Are Miscalled "Spendthrift

Trusts,"

Re-examined, 22 CALIF. L. REv. 471, 483-96 (1934).
28 See, e.g., Congress Hotel Co. v. Martin, 312 Ill. 318, 143 N.E. 838 (1924).
24 E.g., Guernsey v. Lazear, 51 W. Va. 328, 41 S.E. 405 (1902).
See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.100, at 546 (Casner ed. 1952).
See Gray, preface to GRAY, op. cit. supra note 8, at viii-xi.
See ibid.; Costigan, supra note 22, at 487, 493.
See GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note 5, § 555, at 635 n.20; Costigan, supra note 22, at
489-91.
20 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 8, § 261.
30 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2333.01 (Page 1954).
s1 Omo R.Ev. CooE ANN. §§ 2329.62, .66 (Page Supp. 1962).
25
26
27
28
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detract from the force of the court's rejection of spendthrift trusts in general,
since the presence of the statute did not require the invalidation of the restrictive provision. Similar statutes have been held to be merely procedural.32
Even in those states which recognize the validity of spendthrift provisions, a
cestui's equitable interest may be reached by liis creditors in the absence
of valid restrictions. 38 Moreover, the inferior Ohio courts had assumed that,
despite the presence of the statute, spendthrift provisions were effective to
bar ordinary creditors.84 Thus the true basis of the decision, apart from the
usual arguments against validity, is suggested by the court's citation of a
case which involved an attempted restraint of a legal interest and which
strongly supports the policy that what a man owns should be liable for the
payment of his debts. 85 The court's assertion that this fundamental principle requires the invalidation of spendthrift trusts is not weakened by the
fact that the opinion expressly distinguished discretionary trusts, forfeiture
provisions, and trusts for support, since none of those devices involves an
interest absolutely owing to the beneficiary.36
The court's repudiation of the logic and policy underlying the major
premise of the prevailing view, that a donor may dispose of his property
as he wishes, should provide a convincing argument in those seven states
which have not yet determined the validity of spendthrift restrictions.37
Although a uniform reversal of the majority view is improbable, the reasoning of the principal case, by illustrating the essential unsoundness of the
extreme spendthrift trust doctrine, should provide authority for enlarging
the number of exceptions which some courts have recognized in particularly
compelling circumstances.38 If public policy may be invoked by a court to
order a cestui to relinquish a portion of his trust income for the support
of his wife and child,39 it should be equally effective in prohibiting one who
possesses the right to receive an abundance of trust income from refusing
82 See Stansel v. Hahn, 96 Miss. 616, 50 So. 696 (1909); Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77,
14 Atl. 497 (1888). Contra, Eastland v. Jordan, 3 Bibb 186 (Ky. 1813).
88 See REsrATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 147 (1957); 2 Scorr, op. cit. supra note 9,
§ 147.2,
34 O'Connor v. O'Connor, 3 Ohio Op. 2d 186, 141 N.E.2d 691 (C.P. 1957); McWilliams
v. McWilliams, 2 Ohio Op. 2d 77, 140 N.E.2d 80 (C.P. 1956); Frazier v. Wilkinson, IO
Ohio C.C. Dec. 106 (1899) (dictum); see generally, Note, The Spendthrift Trust in Ohio-Rejection or Recognition?, 27 U. Cmc. L. REv. 287 {1958); cf. Morris v. Daiker, 35 Ohio
App. 394, 400, 172 N.E. 546, 552 (1929) (dictum).
35 Hobbs v. Smith, 15 Ohio St. 419 (1864).
86 Principal case at 92. The alternatives to the spendthrift trust in a state with a
statute similar to that in Ohio are discussed in Note, 37 KY. L.J. 426 (1949).
87 There is neither statute nor case law concerning spendthrift trusts in Alaska,
Idaho, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. The decisions seem to be in conflict in Hawaii
and South Carolina. See GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 53, 57.
88 See Zouck v. Zouck, 204 Md. 285, 104 A.2d 573 (1954) (support of cestui's child);
Oberndorf v. Farmers Loan &: Trust Co., 208 N.Y. 367, 102 N.E. 534 (1913) (support of
cestui's wife). See generally IA BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, § 121, at 333-41.
89 See Seidenberg v. Seidenberg, 126 F. Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1954); REsrATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 157, comment a (1957); 44 CAI.IF. L. REv. 615 {1956). Contra, Bucklin v. Warton,
243 Iowa 312, 51 N.W.2d 412 (1952).
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to relinquish at least a part of that right in payment of his creditors. There
would seem to be no valid objection to judicial mitigation of the harsh
effects of the spendthrift trust in its unadulterated form, accomplished by
limiting the protection of the individual cestui to an amount reasonably
necessary for his support.4 0
The most acceptable form of the spendthrift device is that authorized
by statutes which allow a settlor to exempt only 5,000 dollars of trust income per year from the creditors of the beneficiary.41 This legislation prevents the major injustices which are inherent in the unrestrained spendthrift trust. Moreover, such statutes are preferable to the complete rejection
of restraints on involuntary alienation evidenced in the principal case, since
they permit realization of the legitimate desire of a donor to protect an
incompetent beneficiary.
Charles K. Dayton
See Scorr, op. cit. supra note 9, § 152, at 1046; Costigan, supra note 22, at 483-84.
§ 9.1923 (1950); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.25 (1961). The several
types of statutes are reviewed in GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 62-80.
40

n LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.

